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Assessing Adler: 
The Weight of Constitutional History and 
the Future of Religious Freedom 
 
 
Benjamin L. Berger* 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 On most surveys of the constellation of cases that contribute to the 
image of Canada’s distinctive constitutional history, Adler v Ontario1 
appears very faintly, if at all.  This is not because the ruling in Adler was 
trivial.  The case was a significant holding on the interpretation of s 93 of 
the Constitution Act, 1867, and helped build the world of denominational 
education funding in which Ontarians continue to live.  It also contributed 
to the development of certain intriguing constitutional principles, 
including the notion that one part of the Constitution cannot be used to 
challenge another.  Interesting though those points may be in their own 
way, in the hands of most, Adler’s significance ends there.  It is not treated 
as one of the touchstone cases in Canadian constitutional history and is 
often passed over in introductory constitutional law classes.  Even within 
the narrower horizon of Canada’s law and religion jurisprudence, it has a 
                                                     
* Professor and Associate Dean (Students), Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.  
I wish to thank Jamie Shilton for his superb research assistance and insightful comments 
on earlier drafts of this paper, as well as Kate Glover Berger and the participants in the 
Asper Centre Constitutional Roundtable in the Fall of 2017 for their generous and 
helpful engagement with this text and my ideas. 
1 [1996] 2 SCR 609 [Adler].  
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modest profile compared to pre-Charter cases like Saumur v City of Quebec2 
and Chaput v Romain.3 And treatments of post-Charter developments tend 
to move swiftly from key early rulings on s 2(a), like Big M4 and Edwards 
Books,5 to the rich contemporary jurisprudence interpreting and applying 
that right, touching only lightly on Adler.  In other words, on most 
accounts, Adler is largely a case of boutique significance to those interested 
in the history of religion and education in Canada.   
 Adler might thus seem something of a curious choice for a collection 
looking at key cases in Canada’s constitutional history; if one were 
searching for a defining case in the interaction of law and religion, one 
would be wholly forgiven for looking past Adler.  It did not establish new 
principles of general importance or steer a new course for any aspect of 
Canadian constitutional law; indeed, it was an essentially conservative 
outcome.  When attention is turned to Adler, it is as part of the perduring 
(and often heated) political debates about Catholic school funding in 
Ontario and analysis tends to focus either on whether Adler was rightly 
decided or on how the ruling can be overcome by policy change or 
constitutional amendment.6  My purpose in looking again at Adler is not to 
contribute to that debate (though I will return to the question of whether 
the ruling is vulnerable at the end of this paper), nor am I seeking to 
generate a “eureka moment” in which the reader will discover that the 
holdings in Adler are much more significant to contemporary 
constitutional lives than we otherwise recognized.  They are not.   
My more modest claim is that certain features of the decision make 
Adler a distinctively useful perch from which to look backwards and 
forwards in time at the constitutional interaction of law and religion.  The 
case provides a good line of sight on certain themes central to our 
                                                     
2 [1953] 2 SCR 299 [Saumur]. 
3 [1955] SCR 834. 
4 R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd, [1985] 1 SCR 295 [Big M]. 
5 R v Edwards Books, [1986] 2 SCR 713. 
6 For an account of these political debates, and a political argument for the funding of 
some religious schools based on a “right to culture,” see Linda A White, “Liberalism, 
Group Rights and the Boundaries of Toleration: The Case of Minority Religious Schools 
in Ontario” (2003) 36:5 Canadian Journal of Political Science 975. 
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constitutional history with religion, and offers a clear view of issues that 
would define the religion jurisprudence post-Adler and that we can see on 
the path ahead.  My case for Adler’s importance is, thus, more as lens than 
as linchpin.   
 Given its lesser stature, before outlining those themes and issues 
that I want to draw out using Adler, a brief refresher might be helpful.  At 
issue was whether the educational funding scheme in Ontario offended 
the appellants’ religious freedom and equality rights.  The decision was 
released  9 years after Reference Re Bill 30,7 in which the majority of the 
Court upheld Ontario legislation that extended public funding to Catholic 
separate schools.  Justice Wilson, writing for the majority of the Court in 
that case, found that the legislation was a valid exercise of provincial 
power under s 93 that made good on the requirement to fully fund Roman 
Catholic schools.   And although the public funding of Catholic schools 
but no other separate schools “sits uncomfortably with the concept of 
equality embodied in the Charter,” Justice Wilson explained, the legislation 
was “immune” from Charter review under ss 2(a) and 15 because “[i]t was 
never intended…that the Charter could be used to invalidate other 
provisions of the Constitution, particularly a provision such as s 93 which 
represented a fundamental part of the Confederation compromise.”8  The 
appellants in Adler drew the Court’s attention back to Charter questions 
surrounding educational funding in Ontario, arguing first that s 2(a) 
requires public funding for independent religious schools and, second, 
that funding Catholic and public schools but not other separate religious 
schools offended the equality guarantee in s 15.9   Justice Iacobucci, writing 
for the majority of the Court, rejected the s 2(a) argument, holding that any 
claim of public support for religious education had to be found in s 93, and 
that s 2(a) could not “be used to enlarge upon s. 93’s constitutionally 
blessed scheme for public funding of denominational schools”,10 which he 
                                                     
7 [1987] 1 SCR 1148 [Bill 30].   
8 Ibid at 1197–1198. 
9 The appellants also raised a question regarding the provision of health support 
services only in public schools, but this claim was similarly rejected by the majority of 
the Court. 
10 Adler, supra note 1 at para 28. 
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described as a “‘comprehensive code’ of denominational school rights.”11  
With respect to the equality claim, Justice Iacobucci leaned on the Bill 30 
case, holding that “funding for public schools is insulated from Charter 
attack as legislation enacted pursuant to the plenary power granted to the 
provincial legislatures as part of  the Confederation compromise.”12  
Although the province has the power to extend funding to other 
denominational schools if it so chooses, “the funding of public schools 
coupled with the non-funding of private religious schools is immune from 
Charter attack”.13 
 There were three other sets of reasons in Adler.  Justice Sopinka 
(with Major J) concurred, but, rather than relying on the arrangement’s 
immunity from Charter scrutiny, reasoned that the appellants’ s 2(a) rights 
were not breached because the costs incurred by the appellants associated 
with sending their children to private religious schools “is a natural cost 
of the appellants’ religion and does not, therefore, constitute an 
infringement of their freedom of religion.”14  With respect to s 15, the 
public school legislation was making no distinction on the basis of religion 
— these were secular schools open to all, irrespective of religion, and any 
distinction thus flowed from the appellants’ choices — so there could be 
no Charter equality problem.  Justice McLachlin (as she then was) also 
found no breach of s 2(a),15 but would have found a breach of s 15 on the 
basis that “while secular schooling is in theory available to all members of 
the public, the appellants’ religious beliefs preclude them from sending 
their children to public schools.”16  The burdens thereby imposed on the 
                                                     
11 Ibid at para 27. 
12 Ibid at para 47.  He later clarifies that this is not to say that “no legislation in respect of 
public schools is subject to Charter scrutiny”.  It is just “the fact of their existence… that 
is immune from Charter challenge.  Whenever the government decides to go beyond the 
confines of this special mandate, the Charter could be successfully invoked to strike 
down the legislation in question.” (para 49) 
13 Ibid at para 50. 
14 Ibid at para 176. 
15 She based this conclusion on the fact that the scheme involved no compulsion or 
prohibition, which she understood as central to the protections afforded by s 2(a) of the 
Charter.  See ibid, paras 198–200. 
16 Ibid at para 209. 
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appellants based on their religion offended s 15, but McLachlin J would 
have justified this breach under s 1 on the basis that denying funding to 
separate religious schools (beyond the constitutionally-mandated funding 
of Catholic schools) is necessary and proportionate to protect the public 
education system, the purpose of which, she explained, is to encourage “a 
more tolerant harmonious multicultural society”.17  In a decision that laid 
significant weight on the role of religious education in the continuation 
and health of communities that she regarded as insular and vulnerable, 
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé dissented.  She too found a breach of s 15 but, 
unlike Justice McLachlin, she would not have saved the breach under s 1.  
In her view, the government had not discharged its burden of showing 
that partial funding for these religious schools was not a less-impairing 
alternative, and the deleterious impacts of complete non-funding on these 
communities outweighed the largely financial benefits of this policy.   
 That description of the case in mind, I now turn to my reading of 
Adler that positions it at a provocative place in the arc of the development 
of the constitutional interaction of law and religion in Canada.  In what 
follows I draw from both the majority and the minority and dissenting 
reasons in Adler to expose and explore some themes that shape not only 
our religion jurisprudence, but Canadian constitutionalism more 
generally.  I begin in the next section by examining the powerful role 
played in the majority’s reasons by the historical interaction of law and 
religion at the origins of the country, and what this suggests about the 
competing logics at work in Canadian constitutional life.  That discussion 
leads, in turn, to a reflection on the central place of claims about law and 
religion in Canadian nation-building and federalism, a role that it turns 
out is abiding, not just historical.  Part III of the paper then looks forward 
from Adler, first exploring an issue that the case foreshadowed as a central 
vehicle for the future development of the law and religion jurisprudence 
in the subsequent 20 years: education and, in particular, the education of 
children.  I then turn to consider the group or collective aspect of religion, 
an issue that was exposed in the reasons in Adler, but that would lie in 
relative abeyance until very recently, when it reemerged as a central 
question for the future of law and religion in Canada.  The piece concludes 
                                                     
17 Ibid at para 215. 
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with a return to the doctrinal points decided in Adler, asking whether the 
future of Adler might itself be in question.   
 
LOOKING BACKWARD 
Constitutional Logics and the Durability of Origins 
 
One of the most notable features of the majority reasons in Adler is 
the way that they invoke constitutional history as not just informative but 
dispositive of the issues before the Court.  The heart of Justice Iacobucci’s 
reasons is the telling of a story about the constitutional origins of the 
country and an appeal to certain self-evident consequences of that 
narrative.  Section 93, he explains, is a “child born of historical exigency”;18 
it is “the product of an historical compromise which was a crucial step 
along the road leading to Confederation.”19 Justice Iacobucci’s claim about 
origins is ambitious.  Indeed, he ultimately casts s 93 as more than 
“crucial”.  In his telling it is, in fact, a sine qua non for the existence of the 
country: “Without this ‘solemn pact’, this ‘cardinal term’ of Union, there 
would have been no Confederation.”20  Whatever the historical accuracy 
of this account, what is most revealing is the set of implications that he 
draws from it.  In Justice Iacobucci’s hands, this origin story serves as a 
complete answer to the appellants’ claims in Adler: the educational 
funding arrangement established by s 93 is simply exempt from Charter 
review.  As though it is a logical proof, Justice Iacobucci explains that “the 
public school system is an integral part of the Confederation compromise 
and, consequently, receives a protection against constitutional or Charter 
attack.”21    
                                                     
18 Ibid at para 30. 
19 Ibid at para 29. 
20 Ibid at para 29. 
21 Ibid at para 46.  Cossman and Schneiderman describe Iacobucci J’s approach as 
“something of a dodge” in that “[h]e preferred not to take McLachlin J’s path of 
assessing the weight of the Adler parent’s constitutional claim.  Instead, he chose the 
more formalistic path, in which he was barred constitutionally from considering their 
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Of greatest interest to me is what is involved in that rhetorically 
overburdened word “consequently.”  The weakness of Justice Iacobucci’s 
argument on this issue is pointed out by Justices Sopinka and McLachlin, 
who both observe in their reasons that immunity from Charter review does 
not follow naturally from the fact that a matter was part of the 
Confederation constitution.22 Justice Sopinka makes the convincing 
argument that, apart from the guarantee to fund Roman Catholic schools, 
the plenary power over public education “is entrenched only to the same 
extent that other powers in s. 92 are entrenched.  It is in the Constitution 
and like other powers can be exercised only in conformity with the 
Charter.”23  That being so, the interesting question is how we understand 
the peculiar weight that the majority gives to the constitutional history 
surrounding law, religion, and education.  What does this point to?  
One answer is that this somewhat frail reasoning is a consequence 
of the majority’s concern to stay away from the significant budgetary and 
political issues that it felt would flow from subjecting this unequal 
arrangement to Charter scrutiny.  If the five judges in the majority could 
not see a path of reasoning that avoided a breach or could save that breach, 
perhaps a little bit of tortured reasoning was a small price to pay.  Even if 
part of the answer, this is not a full or satisfying explanation of why this 
reasoning carried the day.  There is something else, something larger, 
going on here. 
I have elsewhere argued that to understand Canadian 
constitutional culture, at both a structural level and also in the finer strokes 
surrounding given issues, one must appreciate that Canadians are 
children of two constitutional logics: that of the local, the particular, and 
of harmonious relations between diverse communities achieved through 
political compromise; and that of the universal and faith in the reason of 
legal principle.24  These competing logics are not pure forms of some sort 
                                                     
claims on the merits.”  Brenda Cossman & David Schneiderman, “Beyond Intersecting 
Rights: The Constitutional Judge as ‘Complex Self’” (2007) 57:2 UTLJ 431 at 440–441. 
22 See Adler, supra note 1 at paras 143 and 194, respectively. 
23 Ibid at para 143. 
24 Benjamin L Berger, “Children of Two Logics: A Way into Canadian Constitutional 
Culture” (2013) 11:2 International Journal of Constitutional Law 319. 
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but, rather, imaginative formations about the nature of government, 
community, and authority that pull on one another at all points.  Tracking 
the abiding relationship between these two logics of constitutionalism is 
crucial to understanding the nature of Canadian constitutional culture.   
Prior to the Charter, the heart of the Canadian constitutional project 
was the logic of compromise, relativism, and local interest, negotiated into 
workable configurations that bound communities together.  Nobility lay 
in making government work here, in this place, given local conditions, and 
the specific interests of given communities.  Canadian constitutionalism 
was an exercise in the logic of the particular; it was consummately political.  
With the Charter, the culture of Canadian constitutionalism shifted.  The 
logic of universal human rights and freedoms, focused on the relationship 
between state and citizen, migrated to the centre of public consciousness 
about what Canadian constitutionalism entails.  This is a constitutionalism 
in which the all-purpose reason of proportionality balancing is the lodestar 
of good governance, just as it is across the Western world.25  One cannot 
appreciate Canadian constitutionalism without recognizing that this 
second, powerful logic has never entirely displaced the first.26  When we 
find that the particular or political resists annexation by the logic of the 
                                                     
25 For a sense of the dominance of ideas of proportionality in modern thinking about 
constitutionalism, see, e.g., Robert Alexy, “Constitutional Rights, Balancing, and 
Rationality” (2003) 16 Ratio Juris 131; David M Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (Oxford; 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); Aharon Barak, “Proportional Effect: The 
Israeli Experience” (2007) 57 UTLJ 369.  For a critical discussion of the descriptive 
sufficiency of such theories, see Grégoire CN Webber, “Proportionality, Balancing, and 
the Cult of Constitutional Rights Scholarship” (2010) 23 Can JL & Jur 179; Benjamin L 
Berger, “The Abiding Presence of Conscience: Criminal Justice Against the Law and the 
Modern Constitutional Imagination” (2011) 61:4 UTLJ 579. 
26 In an article exploring the so-called “no hierarchy of rights doctrine,” of which he sees 
Iacobucci J’s reasons serving as an example, Mark Carter explains the majority reasons 
as reflecting a view “that the Constitution is a somewhat fragile amalgam of responses 
to political and historical contingencies and curious normative mandates.”  Mark Carter, 
“An Analysis of the ‘No Hierarchy of Constitutional Rights’ Doctrine” (2006) 12:1 
Review of Constitutional Studies 19 at 40.  “It is no surprise, therefore,” Carter explains, 
“that parts of the Constitution that guarantee rights and privileges in a manner that 
reflects various historic exigencies — e.g., denominational school guarantees of the 
confederation period, language education rights of the patriation period — may not 
measure up to the particular rational demands of the universal human rights values that 
are contained in the Charter” (ibid). 
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universal we have our hands on something important.  At such points the 
obduracy of the particular is expressing something essential about 
constitutional identity.   
Adler marked one such point in Canadian constitutional history and 
can be read as an expression of a constitutional system shaped by 
competing logics.  When Justice Iacobucci invokes the solemnity and 
historical centrality of s 93 he is appealing to the durability and force of the 
older logic of the constitution as political compromise.  And yet the 
appellants were correct: this historical compact could not be squared 
neatly with a principled commitment to religious freedom and equality.27  
As the UN Human Rights Committee put it so evocatively in its decision 
of the same year, finding Canada in violation of article 26 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights for this educational 
funding arrangement, “the fact that a distinction is enshrined in the 
Constitution does not render it reasonable and objective.”28  Quite so.  But 
the UNHRC is not embedded in Canadian constitutional culture or 
responsible for reflecting core features of our constitutional experience.  As 
I read it, the majority reasons in Adler are seeking to capture an intuition 
that this part of the Constitution and the Charter are simply up to different 
things, each giving expression to different aspects of our constitutional 
identity.  The Catholic schooling question participates in one of the grand 
narratives of Canadian self-understanding.  The story of Canada as built 
on two foundational cultures — the English and the French — has been, 
despite its under-inclusivity, basic to Canadian self-understanding, and 
                                                     
27 In his discussion of Adler and section 93, Richard Moon seeks to square this, 
proposing “a liberal or principled interpretation of the provision — a reading of the 
provision as a minority right”.  This is a reading, he suggests, that, given historical 
change and the contemporary “non-denominational” nature of public schools, would 
support either “the ending of separate school rights in Ontario now that the reason for 
these rights has ceased to exist”, or the extension of this right to other religious groups 
in the province.” (Freedom of Conscience and Religion (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2014) at 166–
167.)  I return to the plausibility of a reinterpretation of section 93 in the conclusion of 
this article, but for now it is worthwhile noting that Moon’s interpretation depends 
precisely on overwriting the historical logic of community specificity with the a modern 
liberal logic.  My argument is that, apart from the possibility of doing so, it is the 
resistance to doing so that is of interest for one interested in understanding constitutional 
identity. 
28 Waldman v Canada, HCROR, 76th Sess, Annex, Communication No 694/1996 (1996). 
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the question of Catholic and Protestant schooling, particularly Catholic 
schooling in Ontario, is a kind of synecdoche for this larger narrative.29  
These origins were not something that the Court was willing to see as 
wholly digestible by the reason of the Charter. 
Perhaps one way of understanding this role for constitutional 
history in Adler using concepts more recently invoked by the Court itself 
is that the majority in Adler was describing the particular funding 
arrangement surrounding religion and education as a part of Canada’s 
“constitutional architecture.”30  Not a policy or systemic design question 
like others, this compromise had to be understood in fundamentally 
historical terms and as expressing a distinctive political arrangement.  
Thus established, a change would have to be a matter of amendment that 
follows on a new political self-understanding.31  If a change is to occur — 
and it may — it will signal a change in the basic narratives of the 
constitutional culture, not a sudden realization of the unreasonableness of 
the prior arrangement.  Indeed, in all of these dimensions, including in the 
overarching narrative of nation-building to which the Court appeals, there 
are resonances between Adler and the Supreme Court Reference in which the 
Court recently leaned on this idea of “constitutional architecture”.   
Looking back — and watching as the Court itself looked back — 
Adler perhaps reflects a moment at which religion, and its historical role in 
the formation of Canada, became the occasion for exposing something 
deep about Canadian constitutional identity and the relationship between 
the two constitutional logics that we all inhabit.  But this conclusion pushes 
us to further questions: what precisely is the relationship between law, 
religion, and Canadian nation-building, and does that relationship persist?  
 
 
                                                     
29 On the role of appeal to grand narratives in the persuasive task of reason-giving, see 
Paul W Kahn, Making the Case: The Art of the Judicial Opinion (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2016). 
30 Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss 5 and 6, 2014 SCC 21 [Supreme Court Reference]; 
Reference re Senate Reform, 2014 SCC 32. 
31 As, of course, it was in both Québec and Newfoundland.  
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Religion, Nation Building, and Federalism 
 
In a 2003 article, Talal Asad observed that “[a]ll modern states, even 
those committed to promoting ‘tolerance,’ are built on complicated 
emotional inheritances that determine relations among its citizens.”32  The 
heavy reliance on constitutional history in the majority reasons in Adler 
points to some of the deep “emotional inheritances” that have shaped the 
Canadian state and, as I argued above, constitutional identity.  Asad’s 
statement was part of a reflection on the French debates of the time 
surrounding the wearing of the so-called “Islamic Veil” (the hijab).  He 
argued that the invocation of laïcité — a particular brand of secularism 
with political currency in France shaped by its distinctive emotional 
inheritances — could be understood as part of the process by which the 
French state asserted its republican personality or identity.  Asad’s piece 
is an important reflection on the way in which, in these debates, the French 
state made use of its relationship with religion to establish and defend — 
to “confirm,”33 in Asad’s words — its sovereignty.   
I suggest that the majority’s heavy reliance in Adler on the historical 
constitutional relationship with religion can be taken as an invitation to 
see the ways in which Asad’s description was historically true in Canada 
as well, and continues to be true in important ways.  In our constitutional 
lives, religion is not simply a social fact to be managed, or something that 
is acted upon constitutionally; it is part of the material that is manipulated 
in nation-building, informing the politics of sovereignty and federalism in 
continuingly important ways.  It is easier for Canadians to see the role of 
religion as part of the raw material for nation-building when we look 
elsewhere in the world.  Appreciation for the role of religion in constituting 
the sovereign state is unavoidable when one considers states like India or 
Israel.  Turkey and Pakistan also spring to mind as contemporary cases in 
which religion is stitched deeply into the formation and constitutional 
politics of the modern state.  Benjamin Schonthal has shown how this 
                                                     
32 Talal Asad, “French Secularism and the ‘Islamic Veil Affair’” (2003) 8 The Hedgehog 
Review 93 at 102. 
33 Ibid at 101. 
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continues to work itself out in complicated ways in Sri Lanka.34  But this 
relationship between religion and nation-building is equally, though 
differently, apparent in Canada, as the Adler majority’s Charter-
immunizing appeal to constitutional history indicates. 
An important part of the story of the role of religion in the 
constitution (in both senses of that word) of Canada is a narrative about 
colonialism and Indigenous peoples.  Religion — both its use and its 
suppression — was central in shaping the foundational relationship 
between the Canadian state and Indigenous peoples.  The early colonial 
project was one in which religious missionaries played a crucial role, 
sometimes extending state power and sometimes aligning with 
Indigenous communities in advocating for the recognition of Aboriginal 
rights and sovereignty.35  With the expansion westward of the Canadian 
state and its claims for sovereignty, the Federal government banned 
Indigenous religious rituals and practices such as the potlatch as part of its 
effort to consolidate political and economic control over Indigenous 
people and their territories.  There is a dialectic here between denials of 
religion and denials of sovereignty, and thus between denials of religious 
freedom and the yearning to transform a wish for colonial sovereignty into 
political and constitutional fact.   
One sees these links between religion and the flexing of political 
sovereignty clearly, though tragically, in the history of the residential 
school system in Canada.  In a devastating project aimed at cultural 
extinguishment, the Canadian state worked with the churches in 
administering this system.  Indigenous communities are still, 
inspirationally, overcoming its ruinous effects, which continue to 
condition the political and legal relationship between the Canadian state 
and Indigenous peoples.36  This history is the subject of increasing 
                                                     
34 Benjamin Schonthal, Buddhism, Politics and the Limits of Law: The Pyrrhic 
Constitutionalism of Sri Lanka (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
35 Hamar Foster & Benjamin L Berger, “From Humble Prayers to Legal Demands: The 
Cowichan Petition of 1909 and the British Columbia Indian Land Question” in Hamar 
Foster & Benjamin L Berger, eds, The Grand Experiment: Law and Legal Culture in British 
Settler Societies (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008) 240. 
36 For an essential history, see JR Miller, Shingwauk’s Vision: A History of Native 
Residential Schools (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996).  For recent scholarship 
examining what a reconstructed constitutional relationship might look like, see, e.g., 
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understanding and study amongst scholars of Indigenous law and politics 
in Canada, but it is rarely meaningfully analyzed as part of the history of 
religious freedom and difference in Canada.  The story of religion, state, 
and Indigenous peoples must be excavated and studied as a central part 
of the distinctive history — the emotional inheritances — of law and 
religion in Canada; and central to that story is the relationship between 
political identity, religion, and claims to sovereignty.   
But the majority reasons in Adler also point directly to the way in 
which this tethering of religion and sovereignty was also core to the 
development and identity of Canadian constitutional federalism.  The 
Treaty of Paris,37 which marked the end of the Seven Years’ War and 
imperial hostilities in Canada, acknowledged the political and practical 
realities of British rule over a substantial French Catholic population with 
the following guarantee, something of an early protection of religious 
freedom: “His Britannick Majesty, on his side, agrees to grant the liberty 
of the Catholick religion to the inhabitants of Canada: he will, in 
consequence, give the most precise and effectual orders, that his new 
Roman Catholic subjects may profess the worship of their religion 
according to the rites of the Romish church, as far as the law of Great 
Britain permit.”  The Quebec Act, 1774,38 another crucial step in the 
constitutional history of Canada, included similar provisions providing 
special rights to the Roman Catholic Church, and the Constitutional Act, 
179139 extended privileges and protections to the Anglican Church in 
recognition of its special status in England.40  This history of the formative 
                                                     
John Borrows & Michael Coyle, eds, The Right Relationship: Reimagining the 
Implementation of Historical Treaties (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 
2017); Patrick Macklem & Douglas Sanderson, eds, From Recognition to Reconciliation: 
Essays on the Constitutional Entrenchment of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2016); John Borrows, Freedom and Indigenous 
Constitutionalism (Toronto; Buffalo; London: University of Toronto Press, 2016). 
37 (1763) France, Britain, and Spain, 10 February 1763. 
38 (UK), 14 Geo III, c 83. 
39 (UK), 31 Geo III, c 31. 
40 Janet Epp Buckingham, Fighting over God: A Legal and Political History of Religious 
Freedom in Canada (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2014); MH Ogilvie, Religious 
Institutions and the Law in Canada, 4th ed, Essentials of Canadian law (Toronto: Irwin 
Law, 2017). 
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relationship between French and English communities, refracted through 
their constitutive religious identities, found expression at confederation 
with s 93.  It is that politico-religious dynamic that Justice Iacobucci 
invokes when he speaks of s 93 as a ‘solemn pact’ without which “there 
would have been no Confederation”;41 historically, both our federal 
structure and the development of a sovereign state are tightly imbricated 
with religious identity.  As in the case of Indigenous peoples — but with 
such a fundamentally difference valence — sovereignty and nation were 
forged in part using particular claims about the state’s relationship with 
religion and attitude towards religious difference.  
But this link between religion, sovereignty, and nation is not merely 
a matter of the mists of our constitutional history.  We see the enduring 
expression of this genetic link in our most prominent contemporary 
debates.  In the fall of 2013, a minority sovereigntist Parti Québécois 
government introduced Bill 60, a bill referred to as the “Charter of Québec 
Values” or, as it was called in much of the debate that ensued, the “Charter 
of Secularism.”42  The Bill sought to respond to one of the most contentious 
political issues within Québec at the time, the accommodation and 
management of religious difference.  It did so by declaring the religious 
neutrality and secular nature of the state and with a contentious 
prohibition on employees of public bodies from wearing “ostentatious” or 
conspicuous religious symbols, such as turbans, kippot, and headscarves.  
With this proposed ban, the Parti Québecois government charted out a 
form of secularism for Québec quite at odds with Canadian constitutional 
wisdom and thereby ignited a fierce debate, both inside and outside of 
Québec.  Most agreed that if it were passed and challenged in the courts, 
this Bill would be declared unconstitutional in light of the Canadian 
Charter, as well as inconsistent with Québec’s own human rights 
commitments.  For a variety of reasons, the Parti Québécois suffered a 
resounding defeat in a snap election at the centre of which they placed this 
proposal.  Owing to that defeat, the “Charter of Secularism” moved 
                                                     
41 Adler, supra note 1 at para 29. 
42 Charter affirming the values of state secularism and religious neutrality and of equality 
between women and men, and providing a framework for accommodation requests, 1st Sess, 40th 
Leg, Québec, 2013. 
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temporarily to the political background, though echoes of it have 
reappeared in recent years.43   
This unfolding of events is illuminating for my purposes because of 
the different stories that can be told about this proposed charter and why 
it emerged in Québec.44  One story is about the progressive stripping of 
religion from Québec culture and politics — the “secularization” of 
Québec.  Since the 1960s and the “Quiet Revolution,” the Catholic Church 
had been ousted from its former position of overt cultural and political 
influence.45  From a highly Catholic society since prior to Confederation, 
Québec had become less and less overtly religious and its strong identity 
with the Catholic religion had been replaced with something more akin to 
a pervasive antipathy.  The “Charter of Secularism” sought to formalize a 
French form of laïcité that (however anachronistically) was felt to be more 
natural and fitted to Québec society than the multiculturalism found 
elsewhere in the country.  And so one way of reading this proposed charter 
is as the next move in this progressive marginalization of religion in 
Québec’s political life.  This is a story of discontinuity and change from a 
Catholic past to a secular present, the artefact of a fundamental shift in the 
role of religion in Québec’s legal and political life.  And there is much that 
is true about this story.   
                                                     
43 See Catherine Porter, “Behind Quebec’s Ban on Face Coverings, a Debate Over 
Identity”, The New York Times (25 October 2017), online: 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/25/world/canada/quebec-ban-face-
coverings.html>; Philip Authier, “‘Public services should be given and received with an 
open face’: Couillard”, Montreal Gazette (20 October 2017), online: 
<http://montrealgazette.com/news/quebec/despite-controversy-bill-62-on-state-
neutrality-sails-into-law-in-a-badly-split-vote>. 
44 I explore these contending stories and the lessons that can be drawn from them at 
more length in Benjamin L Berger, “Faith in Sovereignty: Religion and Secularism in the 
Politics of Canadian Federalism” (2014) 35:4 Istituzioni del Federalismo 939. 
45 For more on the Quiet Revolution, see Gregory Baum, “Catholicism and 
Secularization in Quebec” in David Lyon & Marguerite Van Die, eds, Rethinking Church, 
State, and Modernity: Canada Between Europe and America (Toronto; Buffalo; London: 
University of Toronto Press, 2000) 149; David Seljak, “Why the Quiet Revolution was 
‘Quiet’: The Catholic Church’s Reaction to the Secularization of Nationalism in Quebec 
after 1960” (1996) 62 Historical Studies 109. 
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But another (and I think deeper) account reads the “Charter of 
Québec Values” as a story of continuity in the structural relationship 
whereby a distinctive relationship with religion has consistently been 
invoked as a dimension of the politics of federalism in Canada and an 
emblem or standard for Québec’s political sovereignty.  In the early years, 
Roman Catholicism was the foundation of the religious uniqueness of 
Québec, a singularity that was part of the basis for securing political 
identity within the Canadian state; today, the terms that mark that 
difference have shifted from “Roman Catholicism” to “laïcité,” but the 
essential role played by appeal to a unique relationship with religion has 
remained.  At a time at which there was an apparent lack of general 
appetite on questions of sovereignty, the assertion of a distinctive 
relationship to religion — here, a different conception of the secular — 
served political purposes in invigorating a debate about Québec’s unique 
place in the federation.  The preamble to the “Charter of Québec Values” 
is revealing: “Whereas equality between women and men and the primacy 
of the French language as well as the separation of religions and state and 
the religious neutrality and secular nature of the state are fundamental 
values of the Québec nation…”.46 Defining a distinctive relationship with 
religion has always been a key aspect of how Québec has distinguished its 
political character from that of the rest of Canada and this has very much 
survived the Quiet Revolution.  Federalism is fundamentally concerned 
with the construction and negotiation of political identity.  And given the 
historically central role that religion has played in the definition of 
community belonging and national identity in Canada, it would be 
surprising, indeed, if contemporary debates about religion and 
contemporary debates about federalism did not converge and interact.   
Reading Adler is, thus, an evocative way of looking back and seeing 
the relationship between religion, sovereignty, and nation building in 
Canadian constitutional history.  The story that Justice Iacobucci tells in 
his majority reasons, and the dispositive force that he gives to these 
historical dynamics, speaks to only part of the “complicated emotional 
inheritances” surrounding religion and the state in Canada.  But hearing 
that story, we are invited to broaden our gaze and think about the other 
ways in which the management, invocation, and suppression of religion 
                                                     
46 Emphasis added.   
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has been key to shaping the constitutional and political order in which we 
live.  It also directs us forward, suggesting ways in which religion and the 
encounter with religious difference continues to be an important force 
shaping our constitutional politics even — indeed, especially — in a 
political and legal world committed to some vision of secularism and state 
neutrality.  With that nudge forward, I now turn to the ways in which Adler 
not only shed light on our constitutional history of law and religion, but 
anticipated key axes of debate in our law of religious freedom in the years 
to follow.   
 
LOOKING FORWARD 
The Role of Education 
 
Adler was, of course, not the first case under the Charter that 
engaged questions of freedom of religion and the education of children.  
Zylberberg v Sudbury Board of Education47 saw the Ontario Court of Appeal 
conclude that the recitation of the Lord’s Prayer at the start of school days 
in public schools was an unjustified limitation on s 2(a).  The Court ruled 
that the purpose of the practice was religious (offending the principles set 
out in Big M) and, moreover, that the effect of the practice was to impose 
a form of religious coercion on students, inconsistent with freedom of 
religion.  Similarly, in Canadian Civil Liberties Association v Ontario (Minister 
of Education),48 the same court held that a provincial regulation that 
required periods of religious education in public schools was incompatible 
with s 2(a) because it pursued a form of Christian religious indoctrination 
incompatible with freedom from religious coercion.   
And yet Adler marked a shift in the focus of these education cases, 
one that would presage a key current in the development of the law of 
religious freedom in Canada over the subsequent two decades.  Early cases 
like Zylberberg and CCLA, and even the Bill 30 case, were essentially 
concerned with using section 2(a) to challenge the continued presence of 
historical Christian elements within the public education system.  They 
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were cases in which claimants were, in one form or another, asserting 
freedom from the vestiges of religious privilege embedded in the 
education system.  Adler presented a different kind of claim and, with it, a 
different kind of problem: within a public education system, understood 
as “secular” in one way or another,49 what space can be occupied by 
religion?  Rather than a claim about the liberty found in freedom from 
religion, this species of concern about the meeting of religion and 
education focused on the freedom to exercise religion within an 
overarching secular school system.  Following Adler, cases exploring this 
style of claim would, in fact, serve as a — if not the — principal vehicle for 
the exploration of key issues in the modern relationship between law and 
religion in Canada.  There are, of course, many important cases that are 
not part of this current — cases like Amselem,50 Wilson Colony,51 Bruker,52 
and NS53 — but the number and prominence of such religion and 
education cases within the jurisprudence since Adler is both notable and 
telling.   
The case of Chamberlain v Surrey School District No 3654 involved the 
question of the role that the religious views of the community and of 
school board members could play in making decisions about books 
appropriate for the public school curriculum, here books depicting same 
sex parented families for a Kindergarten-Grade 1 class.  Chamberlain 
remains the Court’s most extended discussion of the meaning of 
“secularism.”  Trinity Western University55 raised the issue of whether a 
private religious university that has a code of conduct that discriminates 
against gay, lesbian, and queer students and faculty can have their teacher 
training program publicly accredited.   The case was a key moment in the 
Court’s effort to delineate a boundary between private belief and public 
                                                     
49 And the understanding of “secularism” within both the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence and the scholarly literature is extremely unstable and always shifting. 
50 Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem, 2004 SCC 47 [Amselem]. 
51 Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37 [Wilson Colony]. 
52 Bruker v Markovitz, 2007 SCC 54 [Bruker]. 
53 R v NS, 2012 SCC 72 [NS]. 
54 [2002] 4 SCR 710 [Chamberlain]. 
55 [2001] 1 SCR 772 [TWU 2001]. 
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conduct in matters of religion.  Although the next installment in the Trinity 
Western story did not involve the education of children, the Court’s 
decisions regarding the accreditation of TWU’s proposed law school 
engaged similar questions of religious freedom as they were expressed in 
the relationship between religious education and public authorities.56  
Multani v Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys57 famously called on the 
Court to decide whether a Sikh student could carry his kirpan at public 
school.  The Court’s decision became a principal touchstone for national 
debates about the nature and boundaries of religious accommodation.  
And the recent case of Loyola High School v Quebec (Attorney General)58 
posed the question of whether and how a private religious high school is 
bound to implement a “neutral” program of education about world 
religions and ethics.  That decision is now the leading case on the fraught 
question of the protection of group or community rights under section 2(a), 
an issue about which I will have more to say in the next section.   
The list is longer, but the point is clear from the foregoing: after 
Adler, many of the chief issues in the contemporary law of religious 
freedom in Canada has been worked out through debates about the 
relationship between religion and public education in Canada.  Indeed, 
combining these decisions with the early Charter cases, Adler itself, and the 
pre-Charter history explored above, both the deeper and the modern 
histories of the legal relationship to religious diversity in Canada could be 
told quite ably through a story about education. 
My purpose in this section is not to rehearse the law flowing from 
these cases.  Instead, what interests me here is the question of why 
education has served as a crucible for the relationship between law and 
religion, such a dominant source of issues that raise axial questions in the 
area.59  I want to explore two elements of an answer, one flowing directly 
from the other, and the reasons given in Adler are my point of entry.  
                                                     
56 Law Society of British Columbia v Trinity Western University, 2018 SCC 32 [TWU 2018]; 
Trinity Western University v Law Society of Upper Canada, 2018 SCC 33. 
57 2006 SCC 6 [Multani]. 
58 2015 SCC 12 [Loyola]. 
59 I explore some of these ideas at greater length in Benjamin L Berger, “Religious 
Diversity, Education, and the ‘Crisis’ in State Neutrality” (2014) 29:1 Canadian Journal 
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In their respective reasons, Justice McLachlin and Justice 
L’Heureux-Dubé map out the key elements of the first part of the answer.  
As a step towards finding that there is an unjustified breach of the Charter, 
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé describes “[t]he interests at stake for the 
appellants” in the case as “the recognition and continuation of these 
communities”.60  For her, the case presents a case involving “the efforts of 
small, insular religious minority communities seeking to survive in a large, 
secular society.”61  She accepts that “control over the education of their 
children [is] essential to the continuation of the religious communities in 
question,”62 and that “it is the very survival of these communities which is 
threatened”63 by the distinction under the Education Act.  By contrast, 
Justice McLachlin, in her section 1 analysis, lays emphasis on the interest 
that the state has in fostering, “a strong public secular school system 
attended by students of all cultural and religious groups.”64  She notes the 
“multicultural, multireligious” nature of Canadian society and observes 
that “[a] multicultural multireligious society can only work, it is felt, if 
people of all groups understand and tolerate each other.”65  “The goal of 
fostering multiracial and multicultural harmony,” she explains, “is of great 
importance in a society as diverse as ours.”66 
Both the state and the religious community have a deep interest in 
the formation of the child.  For religious groups and the state alike, 
education is the means by which culture, tradition, value, and community 
are affirmed and sustained.  All education is thus a political act, concerned 
with inducing a child into a social world.  It is true, as Justice L’Heureux-
Dubé, notes, that the continuation of the religious community — of a social 
                                                     
accommodation and toleration particularly fraught and vexing in educational contexts, 
see Colin Macleod, “Toleration, Children and Education” 42:1 Educational Philosophy 
and Theory 9. 
60 Adler, supra note 1 at para 84. 
61 Ibid at para 86. 
62 Ibid at para 68. 
63 Ibid at para 86. 
64 Ibid at para 212. 
65 Ibid at para 212. 
66 Ibid at para 224. 
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world — is at stake in the process of education.  Education is an important 
means by which religious beliefs, practices, and identity can be sustained 
intergenerationally.67  But the state is similarly interested in the production 
of a particular social world and the formation of an individual ethically 
fitted for that world; as Justice McLachlin emphasizes, society also 
depends on the cultivation of a certain type of citizen and education is its 
principal tool in equipping the child with the knowledge and skills 
necessary for critical and sensitive engagement in a diverse society.68  And, 
of course, part of the state’s interest in education is in the formation of 
individuals who have political and personal freedom and autonomy that 
extends beyond the religious identity of their community.69 
The fact of these deep, competing interests in the education of 
children points to the second part of an answer to the question, “why is 
education so central to the working out of issues of law and religion?”  The 
topic of education overflows and, in the process, erodes one of the 
principal conceptual devices central to any aspiration to neatly “manage” 
religion in a liberal constitutional order: the public/private divide.  The 
overlapping of community and state interests reflects the fact that 
education is always both intensely private and intrinsically public in 
character.  We acknowledge the core role of the community and the family 
in education at the same time that we recognize the consummately public 
implications of any private decisions made about the education of 
children.  Nor does the distinction between belief and conduct offer much 
to help in resolving issues that arise in matters of education: education is 
keenly interested in and has implications for both.  Denied easy recourse 
to otherwise soothing divides, we are forced to contend with the deeper 
and more difficult questions about the relationship of law and religion, 
including the character of state neutrality, the relationship between 
religious freedom and other constitutional rights, the boundaries of 
                                                     
67 For a discussion of the role of education in preserving and sustaining cultures, see 
White, supra note 6. 
68 This interest would be echoed years later by Justice Deschamps decision in another 
religion and education case, in SL v Commission scolaire des Chênes, 2012 SCC 7, when she 
explained, at para 37, that “[p]arents are free to pass their personal beliefs on to their 
children if they so wish.  However, the early exposure of children to realities that differ 
from those in their immediate family environment is a fact of life in society.”  
69 This is a theme that I develop in Berger, supra note 59. 
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accommodation, and the nature and status of community or collective 
rights.  And so it ought to come as no real surprise that issues of public 
education and religious difference continue to produce some of the most 
fraught questions in freedom of religion.  In the issues that it raised, and 
in the divisions within the Court, Adler thus anticipated that education 
would be a principal vehicle for working out central issues in the 
contemporary interaction of law and religion in Canada. 
 
The Question of the Collective 
 
Adler’s foreshadowing of the key role that education would play in 
the development of the constitutional jurisprudence surrounding religion 
contains within it the seed of another dynamic that would unfold in the 
subsequent Charter law.  At the heart of Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s 
insistence on the equal treatment of religion in her dissenting decision was 
a concern for the relationship between religion and the collective.  She 
acknowledged that the religious interest at work for the appellants in Adler 
was connected to the “continuation of the religious communities in 
question”70 and characterized the essence of the case as centred on a 
group-based concern: “the efforts of small, insular religious minority 
communities seeking to survive in a large, secular society.”71  Although 
framed within a section 15(1) equality analysis rather than under section 
2(a), the group or collective dimension of the constitutional protection of 
religion was very much at the heart of her analysis.  Justice Iacobucci gave 
much less regard to the collective interests of the claimants in the case, 
though by emphasizing the Confederation compromise, he could be 
understood as privileging the political settlements as between religious 
groups over the claims brought by individual claimants under the Charter.  
And Justice Sopinka, who so emphasized the choices of parents as the root 
of any pernicious effects suffered through the educational funding 
scheme, gave no meaningful regard to groups and collective interests.  The 
decision was a “loss” for the religious communities concerned with the 
education funding scheme in Ontario, but Justice L’Heureux-Dubé had, in 
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71 Ibid at para 86. 
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her dissent, sounded a clear call for attention to the interests of religious 
communities and groups under the Charter. 
Notes of regard for the collective dimensions of religious life, and 
the salience of those dimensions in constitutional rights analysis, predated 
Adler.  Recall Justice Rand’s statement in Saumur that freedom of religion 
ought to be understood as one of the “original freedoms which are at once 
the necessary attributes and modes of self-expression of human beings and 
the primary conditions of their community life within a legal order.”72  
Freedom of religion, for him, included concern both for the individual and 
the “conditions of their community life”.  But in the post-Charter section 
2(a) jurisprudence the overwhelming tendency has been to prioritize the 
individual and his or her personal religious freedom, rather than — and 
sometimes at the expense of — understanding religion as inherently tied 
to communities and collectivities.73  The path was laid out in Big M, in 
which Justice Dickson explained that “[w]ith the Charter, it [had] become 
the right of every Canadian to work out for himself or herself what his or 
her religious obligations, if any, should be.”74  But the individualist 
rendering of religious freedom was doctrinally solidified in Amselem,75 in 
which the Court adopted its subjective sincerity test for section 2(a).  
Focussing on religion as being, in essence, “about freely and deeply held 
personal convictions or beliefs,”76 the Court held that to gain access to the 
protection of section 2(a) a claimant need only “demonstrate that he or she 
sincerely believes in a practice or belief that has a nexus with religion.”77  
The practice or belief need not accord with the dogma or positions of 
religious officials or communities; if this subjective sincerity exists, no 
matter how idiosyncratic, section 2(a) protects against non-trivial 
interferences with those practices and beliefs.   
                                                     
72 Saumur, supra note 2 at 329. 
73 I discuss this in Benjamin L Berger, Law’s Religion: Religious Difference and the Claims of 
Constitutionalism (Toronto; Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 2015) at 66–78. 
74 Big M, supra note 4 at 351. 
75 Supra note 50. 
76 Ibid at para 39. 
77 Ibid at para 65. 
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A series of cases decided under section 2(a) bear the imprint of this 
individualism, but the high-water mark came with the Court’s decision in 
Wilson Colony,78 in which a small Hutterite community objected that the 
requirement for a photograph on their drivers’ licenses unjustifiably 
offended their right to religious freedom.  Though she accepted that 
religion has a “collective aspect,” Chief Justice McLachlin, writing for the 
majority explained that the “broader impact of the photo requirement on 
the Wilson Colony community” was relevant only at the proportionality 
stage of the analysis and did not “transform the essential claim… into an 
assertion of a group right.”79  The collective religious interests at play in 
the case thus became simply “costs” associated with the limitation on the 
right, to be weighed against the benefits of the universal photo 
requirement to society at large.   
As in Adler, a strong call for regard for the collective dimensions of 
religion came in the dissenting reasons, here given by Justice Abella.  She 
laid substantial weight on the collective aspects of the claim, emphasizing 
the community’s concern with self-sufficiency and autonomy and noting 
that these commitments were inextricable from the nature of the claim in 
this case — they were the heart of the religious freedom and equality 
claims.  She cited Justice Ritchie’s statement in Hofer v Hofer explaining the 
religious character of the community lifestyle for Hutterites: “[T]he 
activities of the community were evidence of the living church.”80  The 
collective dimension of the religious interests thus foregrounded, Justice 
Abella would have found that the limitation on the right was unjustified.  
The dynamics between the reasons in Adler were, in this respect, replicated 
in Wilson Colony. 
The solicitousness for the individual’s beliefs and choices that we 
have seen in the Charter protection of religion is to be expected: liberal 
constitutionalism sees the individual far more clearly than it does the 
group, treating the individual as the primary unit of constitutional 
                                                     
78 Supra note 51. 
79 Ibid at para 31. 
80 [1970] SCR 958 at 969. 
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analysis.81  But when put into practice, an insistent individualism in the 
legal understanding of religion effaces significant dimensions of religion 
as experienced and lived outside the courtroom.  Religion troubles the 
law’s individualism; phenomenologically, much of what gets categorized 
as religion has an irrepressibly collective dimension and is anchored in the 
lives of communities, complicated though those lives — and 
heterogeneous though the practices and beliefs within those communities 
— might be.82  Even when framed by a priority on the individual, religion 
cannot really be analyzed or understood without regard for the 
communities in which it is lived and that sustain it over time.  Perhaps the 
law can only tolerate for so long such a dissonance between the social 
world as it imagines it and the social world as we find it.   
A case would eventually emerge in the section 2(a) jurisprudence 
in which the Court would seek to find space for regard for the collective 
interests engaged by religion so forcefully urged in the 1996 dissent in 
Adler; and for the reasons that I explored above, it was entirely 
unsurprising that the case would be one involving education.   
The central question in Loyola83 was how a provincially mandated 
“ethics and religious culture” program applied in the context of a private 
Catholic high school.  The program prescribed a curriculum exposing 
students to the beliefs and ethics of different world religions and required 
that the instruction on these topics be conducted from a “neutral and 
objective perspective.”  Loyola objected that requiring a Catholic school to 
teach about Catholicism and the ethics of other traditions in a “neutral 
way” impaired religious freedom.  In finding that Loyola could not be 
                                                     
81 This has been a critique leveled against Charter adjudication since its early days.  See, 
e.g., Joel Bakan, Just Words: Constitutional Rights and Social Wrongs (Toronto; Buffalo: 
University of Toronto Press, 1997). 
82 On the collective and institutional dimensions of religion and their implications for 
the analysis of religious freedom claims, see, e.g., Victor Manuel Muñiz-Fraticelli, The 
Structure of Pluralism: On the Authority of Associations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014); Victor Muñiz-Fraticelli & Lawrence David, “Religious Institutionalism in a 
Canadian Context” (2016) 52:3 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 1049; Dwight Newman, 
Religious Freedom and Communities (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2016); Dwight Newman, 
Community and Collective Rights: A Theoretical Framework for Rights Held by Groups 
(Oxford; Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2011); Ogilvie, supra note 40. 
83 Supra note 58. 
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compelled to teach about Catholicism “in terms defined by the state rather 
than by its own understanding of Catholicism,”84 Justice Abella (now in 
the majority) explained that “[r]eligious freedom under the Charter must… 
account for the socially embedded nature of religious belief, and the deep 
linkages between this belief and its manifestation through communal 
institutions and traditions”.85  She acknowledged that “[t]hese collective 
aspects of religious freedom — in this case, the collective manifestation 
and transmission of Catholic beliefs through a private denominational 
school — [were] a crucial part of Loyola’s claim.”86  In its regard for the 
collective dimensions of religion and in its recognition of the central role 
of education in the sustenance of the religious community, Loyola can be 
viewed as the coming of age of the dissent in Adler. 
Loyola is, to this point, the strongest statement from the Court 
recognizing the collective and group aspects of religious freedom.  Indeed, 
the minority decision in Loyola, written by Chief Justice McLachlin and 
Justice Moldaver, would have gone even further, holding that religious 
organizations themselves could enjoy religious freedom under section 
2(a).  And yet there remains substantial uncertainty about the nature and 
scope of this recognition and what it will mean for religious freedom 
claims on the part of groups and institutions in the coming years.   
It is uncertain, for example, how independent the protection of 
these “collective aspects” of religion really is of the Charter’s traditional 
focus on the individual.  Justice Abella’s describes the collective aspects of 
religion as “manifestations” of individual religious belief and she frames 
the liberty interests involved as those of the “members of the 
community,”87 not the group itself.  On this account, the collective 
dimension of religious freedom is indexed to the individual: she justifies 
the need to give weight to the collective on the grounds that “individuals 
may sometimes require a legal entity in order to give effect to the 
constitutionally protected communal aspects of their religious beliefs and 
                                                     
84 Ibid at para 63. 
85 Ibid at para 60. 
86 Ibid at para 61.   
87 Ibid at paras 61-62. 
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practices.”88  This is true even of the more ambitious minority in Loyola, 
who explain that “[t]he freedom of religion of individuals cannot flourish 
without freedom of religion for the organizations through which those 
individuals express their religious practices and through which they 
transmit their faith.”89  Diagnostically, the key test will come when the 
collective religious interests are at odds with the individual’s religious 
freedom.  I suspect that in such a case, the liberal commitments 
underwriting the constitutional culture will admit of only one outcome.  
And, of course, the subjective sincerity test established in Amselem is 
designed precisely to incline the system in that direction. 
Owing in part to this conceptual uncertainty, it is unclear how 
robust and consequential the courts’ regard for the collective dimension of 
religious freedom will prove to be.  The way that the Court has treated the 
collective aspects of religion since Loyola suggests that both the 
engagement and the effect may be modest.   
In Ktunaxa,90 an Indigenous nation sought to prevent a ski resort 
development in a part of British Columbia on the basis that the 
establishment of permanent overnight accommodation would drive 
Grizzly Bear Spirit from the valley in question (Qat’muk), fundamentally 
disrupting their religious beliefs and practices and, with this, “the vitality 
of their religious community”.91  Thus seeking to establish a novel form of 
s 2(a) protection — one based on the interrelationship between land and 
                                                     
88 Ibid at para 33.  In TWU 2018, supra note 56, discussed in relation to these ideas more 
fully below, Justice Rowe’s separate concurring reasons display what an approach to the 
collective or communal dimensions of religious freedom fully indexed to the individual 
would look like.  He is entirely perspicuous in this: “While acknowledging this 
communal aspect, I underscore that religious freedom is premised on the personal 
volition of individual believers.  Although religious communities may adopt their own 
rules and membership requirements, the foundation of the community remains the 
voluntary choice of individual believers to join together on the basis of their common 
faith” (para 219).  Accordingly, he explains, if TWU possessed any religious freedom 
rights qua community or institution, “these would not extend beyond those held by the 
individual members of the faith community” (ibid). 
89 Supra note 58 at para 94. 
90 Ktunaxa Nation v British Columbia (Forests, Lands and National Resource Operations), 2017 
SCC 54 [Ktunaxa]. 
91 Ibid at para 59. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3269535 
 
 
 
 
Forthcoming in the National Journal of Constitutional Law (2018) (Pre-publication Version) 
 28 
the metaphysical — the Ktunaxa emphasized the communal aspects of 
religion and religious freedom recognized in Loyola.  A majority of the 
Court found that there was no breach of the Ktunaxa’s religious freedom 
because the “[t]he state’s duty under s. 2(a) is not to protect the object of 
beliefs, such as Grizzly Bear Spirit.”92  In arriving at that conclusion, the 
majority acknowledged the collective dimension of the right, but swiftly 
circumscribed its implications, explaining that “the communal aspects of 
freedom of religion do not, and should not, extend s. 2(a)’s protection 
beyond the freedom to have beliefs and the freedom to manifest them.”93   
In TWU 2018, in which the Court considered the Law Society of 
British Columbia’s decision to deny accreditation to TWU’s proposed law 
school because of TWU’s discriminatory community covenant, the 
majority professed the need to “account for the socially embedded nature 
of religious belief, as well as the ‘deep linkages between this belief and its 
manifestation through communal institutions and traditions’”,94 as 
established in Loyola.  And yet these ideas did little work informing the 
analysis.  The majority framed the nature of “the religious belief or practice 
implicated by the LSBC’s decision” in essentially individualistic terms: 
“that members of TWU’s community sincerely believe that studying in a 
community defined by religious beliefs in which members follow 
particular religious rules of conduct contributes to their spiritual 
development.”95  This framing — one that did not draw out the communal 
and group dimensions of the claim — cleared the way for the majority not 
only to find that the LSBC’s decision was reasonable, but (even more 
significantly, to my mind) that the effect of the decision on religious 
                                                     
92 Ibid at para 71.  For critiques of this decision, see Howard Kislowicz and Senwung 
Luk, “Re-contextualizing Ktunaxa Nation v British Columbia: Crown Land, History, and 
Indigenous Religious Freedom”, Supreme  Court Law Review [forthcoming in 2018]; 
Benjamin L Berger, “Liberal Constitutionalism and the Unsettling of the Secular” in Rex 
Adhar, ed., Research Handbook on Law and Religion (Northampton, Mass: Edward Elgar) 
[forthcoming in 2018]. 
93 Ibid at para 74. 
94 TWU 2018, supra note 56 at para 64. 
95 Ibid at para 70. 
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freedom was “of minor significance”96 and not “a serious limitation”.97  
Justices Coté and Brown, writing in dissent and who would have 
characterized the interference with religious freedom as “profound,”98 
pointed to this thinness in the majority’s engagement with the collective 
dimension of religious freedom: “In our view, ensuring full protection for 
the ‘constitutionally protected communal aspects of religious belief and 
practice’ requires more than simply aggregating individual rights claims 
under the amorphous umbrella of an institution’s ‘community’.”99 
We are at an intriguing moment in the development of our religious 
freedom jurisprudence, wrestling with and wondering what it means to 
give regard to the collective, communal, and institutional aspects of 
religious freedom.  And we watch with interest as other countries explore 
the implications of granting collective and corporate religious rights.100  
Along with others, I have found it useful to think about the individual, 
private, and choice-based understanding of religion evidenced in religious 
                                                     
96 Ibid at para 87. 
97 Ibid at para 102.  Though she similarly found that the LSBC’s decision was reasonable, 
Chief Justice McLachlin took issue with this characterization of the impact of the 
decision on freedom of religion as “of minor significance,” in large measure because it 
was the product of an inadequate engagement with the associational dimension of the 
religious interests at play in the case.  “The issue here,” she explains, “is that the 
majority fails to acknowledge the significance that all members abiding by the same 
code of conduct has for a religious community” (para 131).  Her reasons in the case 
show that giving serious regard to the collective dimension of religious freedom does 
not lead inexorably to overweening solicitousness of a community’s interests and 
positions.   
98 Ibid at para 268. 
99 Ibid at para 315, citing to Loyola at paras 33 and 130.  With their greater focus on these 
communal dimensions of the religious freedom claim, Coté and Brown JJ concluded 
that “the LSBC approval decision… is a measure that undermines the core character of a 
lawful religious institution and disrupts the vitality of the CWU community” (at para 
324).   
100 For the cases at the heart of the US experience on this point, see, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor v 
EEOC, 132 S Ct 694 (2012); Burwell v Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc, 134 S Ct 2751 (2014); 
Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 584 U.S. ___ (2018).  For 
reflection on this phenomenon in the US, see Micah Schwartzman, Chad Flanders & Zoë 
Robinson, eds, The Rise of Corporate Religious Liberty (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2016). 
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freedom jurisprudence as a “protestant” approach to the kind of religion 
that attracts constitutional protection.101  If that is an edifying framing, one 
wonders whether the emerging, if tentative, concern for the collective 
dimensions of religion marks something of a “catholic turn” in religious 
freedom in Canada; and how ironic that we might trace the intellectual 
origins of that shift to the dissent in Adler.   
 
CONCLUSION: REASSESSING ADLER? 
 
In this paper I have used Adler as kind of vantage point from which 
to survey the past of the constitutional protection of religion in Canada 
and the future that lay ahead.  Reading Adler this way directs our gaze 
backward, showing the durable role of origins in our contemporary 
constitutional lives.  Concerned as it was with the interaction of the 
historical compromise surrounding religion and religious education found 
in section 93 and the modern rights-protecting focus of ss. 2(a) and 15(1), 
the reasons in Adler — and, in particular, their analytical weaknesses — 
demonstrate the way in which our contemporary constitutional identities 
are not exhausted by the logic of the universal.  Adler also invites us to 
consider the complicated but formative use of religion in Canadian nation-
building and in claims about sovereignty, matters in which religion 
continues to serve an evocative role.   
Adler, we saw, would also anticipate much.  Looking forward, Adler 
pointed to the abidingly central place that education would occupy in 
debates about the constitutional protection of religion in Canada.  In 
particular, Adler opened up the question of what place religion could or 
should have within an otherwise non-religious system of public education, 
a question that would be — in one form or another — at the heart of the 
section 2(a) jurisprudence in the years to come.  And although, in the 
intervening years, the individualism that comes so naturally to Charter 
analysis would take centre stage, the forceful call made in the dissent in 
Adler for attention to the collective and group dimensions of religious 
                                                     
101 See Berger, supra note 72 at 100–101; Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, The Impossibility of 
Religious Freedom (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005) at 7–8. 
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freedom prefigured the ineluctable salience of the interests of the 
community in matters of religious freedom and equality.   
In short, in Adler we can find themes and tensions that have defined 
our constitutional history in regard to religion, as well as markers for what 
would (and still does) lie ahead.  But in closing I want to return briefly to 
a question that I alluded to at the outset of this piece: what of the future of 
the Adler decision itself?  Specifically, is the majority’s holding that the 
Charter has nothing to say about the constitutionality of the 
denominational school funding scheme in Ontario still good law?  In my 
view, after two decades during which that outcome seemed wholly secure, 
the decision mayx now be vulnerable.102 
We are now living in a post-Bedford,103 post-Carter,104 precedential 
ecosystem, in which the Supreme Court’s openness to revisiting past 
decisions is very much on the minds of advocates and scholars.  Bedford 
established that a trial judge can revisit a decision of a higher court, 
including the Supreme Court, “if new legal issues are raised as a 
consequence of significant developments in the law, or if there is a change 
in the circumstances or evidence that fundamentally shifts the parameters 
of the debate.”105  Applying this test in Carter, the Court explained that the 
trial judge was justified in revisiting the Court’s decision in Rodriguez106 
because of changes both in the “matrix of legislative and social facts”107 
and because of material changes in the law of section 7.  In particular, the 
Court noted that “the law on overbreadth, now explicitly recognized as a 
principle of fundamental justice, asks whether the law interferes with 
                                                     
102 I am conscious of the unsuccessful attempt to revisit Adler made in Landau v Ontario 
(Attorney General), 2013 ONSC 6152, but that case predated the key jurisprudential 
changes that I am relying upon in these comments.  In Landau the applicant’s arguments 
focused on UNHRC decisions issued after to Adler and the post-1996 constitutional 
amendments regarding religious education in Québec and Newfoundland. 
103 Canada (Attorney General) v Bedford, 2013 SCC 72 [Bedford]. 
104 Carter v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5 [Carter]. 
105 Bedford, supra note 103 at para 42. 
106 Rodriguez v British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 SCR 519. 
107 Carter, supra note 104 at para 47. 
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some conduct that has no connection to the law’s objectives…. This 
different question may lead to a different answer.”108  And indeed it did. 
A future applicant might well be able to point to changes in the 
circumstances or evidence relevant to considering the issues raised in 
Adler.109  But changes in the evidence and circumstances are not necessary; 
they are just one path to revisiting a past precedent.  The case for 
developments in the law significant enough to reassess the s 2(a) outcome 
in Adler — the other path — is a strong one.  Earlier in this article I 
canvassed one jurisprudential piece that is newly in motion in a way that 
might have implications for a fresh look at Adler, namely the rise of regard 
for group and collective interests within the section 2(a) analysis.  I have 
argued elsewhere that serious attention to the interest of the group, regard 
of the sort found in Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s dissent, would have made 
the result in Adler more difficult to reach.110 
But perhaps the even more material change in the applicable legal 
framework is the emergence of a state duty of religious neutrality as a 
component of the section 2(a) protection.  Crystallized in Mouvement laïque 
québécois v Saguenay (City),111 this duty is one that the Court acknowledged 
is not expressly imposed by section 2(a) but, rather, has arisen “from an 
evolving interpretation of freedom of conscience and religion.”112  The core 
of this duty is the requirement that “that the state neither favour nor hinder 
                                                     
108 Ibid at para 46. 
109 Two areas of development in the “matrix of legislative and social facts” come to 
mind: first, the increased religious diversity of the population in Ontario (though this 
fact might cut in either argumentative direction); and, second, the experience over the 
last two decades of denominational funding schemes in other provinces that have not 
degraded or imperiled the public system.  This latter fact might be most germane in 
meeting the kind of s 1 argument that was the basis for Justice McLachlin’s decision in 
Adler.  Her worries about extending a denominational funding scheme have not been 
borne out in other provinces.  The persuasive force of arguments about relevant changes 
in the social circumstances would depend heavily on the evidence that an applicant 
could adduce. 
110 Berger, supra note 73 at 74. 
111 2015 SCC 15 [Saguenay]. 
112 Ibid at para 71. 
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any particular belief, and the same holds true for non-belief”.113  Drawing 
inspiration for this duty from the jurisprudence subsequent to Adler, 
Justice Gascon, writing for an 8 person majority explained that this duty 
means, in part, that “[t]he state may not act in such a way as to create a 
preferential public space that favours certain religious groups and is 
hostile to others.”114  He summed up as follows:  
When all is said and done, the state's duty to protect every 
person's freedom of conscience and religion means that it 
may not use its powers in such a way as to promote the 
participation of certain believers or non-believers in public 
life to the detriment of others.115 
The tensions between this emergent doctrine and the funding scheme 
considered in Adler might be palpable enough to invite, at least, a fresh 
hard look.  To paraphrase the Court’s reasons in Carter, the duty of state 
neutrality, now explicitly recognized as an aspect of section 2(a), asks a 
new question about the constitutionality of state action.  “This different 
question may lead to a different answer.”116 
 One might object that these developments, significant though they 
may be, say nothing that displaces Justice Iacobucci’s core finding for the 
majority in Adler that section 93 is a “complete code” for denominational 
funding and therefore simply “immune from Charter attack.”117  Perhaps 
so, but it must be recalled that four judges rejected this approach to the 
issues and instead relied on an interpretation of section 2(a) whereby, they 
agreed, there was no breach.  The three reasons that took this path focused 
on the absence of a prohibition or coercion and the fact that religious 
freedom does not include a positive right to funding.118  There is simply 
far more to section 2(a) today.  Can the unanimous ruling in Adler that the 
                                                     
113 Ibid at para 72. 
114 Ibid at para 75. 
115 Ibid at para 76. 
116 Carter, supra note 104 at para 46. 
117 Adler, supra note 1 at para 50. 
118 With Justice Sopinka relying on the now very suspect reasoning that the 
disadvantage experienced by the applicants flowed from their religious tenets and 
choices, not from the statutory scheme.   
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denominational funding scheme did not offend section 2(a)’s protections 
survive these notable changes in the law of religious freedom? 
Exploring these points more fully is the burden of another piece.  
For now, all of this is to suggest that, in addition to serving as an entry 
point into understanding key elements of the history and development of 
law and religion in Canada, reassessing Adler might itself be part of our 
constitutional future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
